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poor people heavily favor policies aimed at redistributing wealth. This assumption
fails to explain the popularity of economic conservatism and the degree of support
for the capitalist system. Such outcomes are typically explained by the suggestion
that most poor people believe they will become rich one day. In a representative
sample of low-income Americans, we observed that less than one-fourth were
optimistic about their economic prospects. Those respondents who believed that
they would become rich one day were no more likely to endorse the legitimacy of
the system and no more supportive of conservative ideology or the Republican
Party, compared to those who did not believe they would become rich. From a
system justification perspective, we propose that people are motivated to defend the
social systems on which they depend, and this confers a psychological advantage
to conservative ideology. Providing ideological support for the status quo serves
epistemic motives to reduce uncertainty, existential motives to reduce threat, and
relational motives to share reality with members of mainstream society. We
summarize evidence from the United States, Argentina, Lebanon, and other coun-
tries bearing on these propositions—including a survey administered shortly before
the 2016 U.S. Presidential election—and discuss political implications of system
justification motivation.
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What is the significance of this article for the general public?
It is commonly assumed that support for economically conservative policies is moti-
vated by self-interest, either because an individual is already wealthy or expects to
become so in the future. The research reviewed here on system justification theory
suggests a different explanation. We propose that conservative ideology is often more
attractive than progressive ideology because people are motivated to defend, bolster,
and justify aspects of the societal status quo as something that is familiar and known.
Although conservatism may address psychological needs for certainty, security, and
shared reality with like-minded others, it can also lead people to downplay injustices
and other social problems as they seek to maintain valued traditions.
Keywords: political ideology, liberalism, conservatism, economic inequality, system
justification
“I understand why the Republicans get 1 percent of the
vote—the richest 1 percent. That other 49% someone
will have to explain to me . . .”
(Bill Maher, 2011, Real Time with Bill Maher)
The theory of rational choice has cast an
especially long shadow over the social sciences,
and the generally sensible proposition that peo-
ple behave in a manner that is congruent with
self-interest has often crowded out other types
of explanation in psychology, politics, and re-
lated disciplines (e.g., Green & Shapiro, 1994).
It is often taken for granted, for instance, that
support for the societal status quo comes more
or less exclusively from those who benefit in
material terms from its maintenance, while
those who are disadvantaged by current condi-
tions are revolutionaries-in-waiting. Thus, one
of the most influential political sociologists of
the 20th century, Seymour Lipset (1960), wrote
that, “Conservatism is especially vulnerable in a
political democracy since, as Abraham Lincoln
said, there are always more poor people than
well-to-do ones, and promises to redistribute
wealth are difficult to rebut” (p. 128).
A great many theorists before and after Lipset
have made precisely the same assumption. As
Bertrand Russell (1938) pointed out, even Karl
Marx—the preeminent theorist of hegemonic
ideology—concurred with orthodox economists
that “economic interest could be taken as the
fundamental motive in the social sciences” (p.
3). Marx did, after all, appeal famously to ra-
tional self-interest when he implored the work-
ing classes to join in international struggle on
the grounds that they had “nothing to lose but
their chains.” The authors of The American
Voter, too, assumed that public opinion was best
understood in terms of the expression of “prim-
itive self-interest” (Campbell, Converse, Miller,
& Stokes, 1960, p. 205), and evolutionary the-
orists today rely very heavily upon the same
assumption (Pinsof & Haselton, 2016; Weeden
& Kurzban, 2017).
Lincoln, Marx, Lipset, and many others are
quite right that throughout history the poor have
vastly outnumbered the rich. Nevertheless, eco-
nomic inequality persists in capitalist democra-
cies around the world (Piketty, 2015), and there
is often considerable ideological support for its
maintenance (Bénabou, 2008; Wisman &
Smith, 2011). Conservative and right-wing po-
litical parties and ideologies not only survive
but continue to thrive throughout Europe and
around the world (e.g., Angelos, 2017; Wig-
more, 2015).
In the United States, self-identified conserva-
tives outnumbered liberals for most of the 20th
century (Bishop, 2005). According to the Gal-
lup polling organization, over the past 25 years
there have been one and a half conservatives for
every liberal (Saad, 2015), and there have been
at least two economic conservatives for every
economic liberal (Jones, 2015). According to
Bénabou (2008), a majority of citizens not only
from the United States and Canada but also
from the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain,
Poland, Italy, Mexico, Brazil, China, India,
South Korea, Philippines, Indonesia, Nigeria,
and Kenya agree that, “The free enterprise sys-
tem and free market economy is the best system
on which to base the future of the world” (p.
323).
Such strong support for the capitalist system
is somewhat surprising given how sharply in-
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come inequality has risen over the past several
decades. Economists agree that by nearly every
metric the rich in the United States and many
other industrialized nations have grown richer,
while the middle and working classes have not
(e.g., Economic Policy Institute, 2012; Piketty,
2015; Stiglitz, 2015). Between 1979 and 2012,
the earnings of the top 0.1% quadrupled in the
United States, and the earnings of the top 1%
more than doubled, while the earnings of the
remainder of the population either remained
stagnant or declined in real terms (Bernstein,
2016).
Poverty continues to afflict the lives of mil-
lions (e.g., Corning, 2011). And yet genuine
efforts to redistribute wealth have been few and
far between, and they have not been especially
difficult to defeat, often because poor people are
scarcely more likely than the wealthy to support
redistributive policies—such as welfare, social-
ized medicine, and progressive forms of taxa-
tion—that would benefit them in material terms
(Ashok, Kuziemko, & Washington, 2015;
Gilens, 1999; Graetz & Shapiro, 2005; Kelly &
Enns, 2010; Luttig, 2013).
Most citizens appear to reject progressive
alternatives to the economic status quo. In 2016,
the Democratic-Socialist Bernie Sanders re-
ceived approximately 13 million votes during
the Democratic primary, which was a good
showing by historical standards. Nevertheless,
Sanders lost the nomination to Hillary Clinton,
who distanced herself from Sanders’ economic
views throughout the campaign. The billionaire
real-estate mogul Donald Trump received 14
million votes in the Republican primary and 62
million votes in the general election—nearly
five times as many as Sanders received during
the primary campaign.
For decades Democratic strategists have
come to depend upon liberal, self-interested
voting on the part of ethnic minorities and mem-
bers of disadvantaged groups to deliver a stable,
if not permanent, electoral majority for the
Democratic Party (Judis & Teixeira, 2004; Phil-
lips, 2016; Teixeira, 2012). Political analysts
often claim that demographic changes will spell
the end of conservative politics over the next
few decades—as European Americans lose
their status as a numerical majority group in the
United States (Colby & Ortman, 2015; New-
port, 2013).
In the final months of the 2016 U.S. Presi-
dential campaign, nearly everyone expected
Hillary Rodham Clinton to win. Indeed, she led
in almost every national poll leading up to the
election, and many pundits and advisors as-
sumed that she would eventually win over the
working class (see Cohn, 2016). Fatefully, these
expectations proved to be overly optimistic, and
Donald Trump was elected President after tak-
ing 67% of the White working-class vote (Ty-
son & Maniam, 2016).1 As Garrison Keillor put
it, “The disaffected White blue-collar workers
elected a Fifth Avenue tycoon to rescue them
from the elitists.” But why?
In this article, we describe previously pub-
lished and unpublished pieces of evidence ad-
dressing social psychological aspects of work-
ing-class conservatism and related phenomena.
In so doing, we advance a motivational analysis
of political ideology and system justification
that helps to explain why people who are dis-
advantaged by the societal status quo may nev-
ertheless endorse its legitimacy. In many cases
we find that members of disadvantaged groups
hold attitudes about the social and economic
system that are quite similar to those held by
members of more advantaged groups. In this
respect, ideology sometimes trumps self-
interest. We conclude that conservative beliefs
and ideologies in favor of the status quo possess
certain psychological advantages over liberal or
progressive alternatives to the status quo, but
not for the reasons that are commonly assumed.
Do Poor People Support the System
Because They Believe They Will Become
Rich One Day?
Commentators on the political left and right
routinely float the notion that members of the
working class keep the faith, especially in the
1 We do not mean to oversimplify the role of economic
factors in the 2016 election or to suggest that social class
was the only or even the primary driver of support for
Donald Trump. As others have pointed out, Trump’s sup-
porters appear to have been slightly higher than average in
terms of income (Carnes & Lupu, 2017). At the same time,
35% of Trump’s 63 million votes came from people who
earned less than $50,000/year, which means that 22 million
people in this income group voted for him. In any case, we
discuss a number of variables other than social class that
appear to have influenced the election outcome in the Ap-
plications section at the end of this article.
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United States, that they will one day become
wealthy—and that this explains their support
for conservative economic policies. “None of us
is really poor,” as David Brooks put it, “we’re
just pre-rich.”
Bill Maher devoted several minutes of his
comedy special Live from D.C. to the popular
ideological trope that the United States is com-
prised not of “Have’s” and “Have-Not’s” but
rather “Haves” and “Soon-to-Have’s.” To illus-
trate the sentiment, he quoted from Republican
presidential candidate Marco Rubio’s stump
speech: “When Americans drive through a
wealthy neighborhood, they’re not jealous.
They say, ‘Congratulations, we’ll be joining
you soon!’” And in a penetrating analysis of the
conservative effort to repeal estate taxes, Graetz
and Shapiro (2005) cite “wishful thinking” as
one reason for the success of those efforts:
“large numbers of Americans are unrealistically
optimistic about their . . . economic circum-
stances. They underestimate the levels of in-
equality, overestimate their own wealth com-
pared to others, and exaggerate their likelihood
of moving up significantly and getting rich” (p.
119).
In our own research, we have seen little ev-
idence that the majority of poor people believe
that they will end up rich. In a Knowledge
Networks survey of low-income Americans
whose family incomes were less than $30,000/
year, we observed that most respondents were
fairly pessimistic (or perhaps realistic) about
their own financial futures. Specifically, when
asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the
statement: “I believe that one day I may become
rich,” only 24.2% of the respondents agreed.
Nearly half (47.3%) disagreed with the state-
ment, and an additional 28.6% were unsure
(Rankin, Jost, & Wakslak, 2009). These data are
based on a fairly small (but representative) sam-
ple of low-income respondents, so they should
be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, they
do provide some basis for questioning the wide-
spread assumption that the expectation of future
wealth accounts for the popularity of economi-
cally conservative beliefs, opinions, and values.
Moreover, there were very few differences
between these three groups of respondents in
terms of their social and political attitudes (see
Table 1). Importantly, those respondents who
believed that they would become rich one day
Table 1
Means (and Standard Deviations) of System Justification and Other Variables as
a Function of Whether Participants Believed That They Would Become Rich
One Day
“I believe that one day I may become rich”
Disagree Uncertain Agree
Variable (n  86) (n  49–52) (n  43–44)
System justification (1–9) 4.62 (1.24) 4.63 (1.04) 4.58 (1.66)
Liberal-conservative (1–7) 4.38 (2.04) 4.43 (1.75) 4.00 (2.09)
Republican partisanship (1–7) 3.13 (2.16) 3.79 (2.11) 3.16 (2.17)
Religiosity (1–7) 4.53 (2.05) 4.96 (1.51) 4.66 (2.06)
Purpose in Life (1–7) 5.26 (1.21) 5.13 (1.04) 5.49 (1.26)
Sense of mastery (1–7) 5.05a (1.23) 5.02a (1.15) 5.99b (.89)
Sense of security (1–7) 4.12 (1.36) 4.39 (1.35) 4.64 (1.37)
Life satisfaction (1–7) 4.63 (1.58) 4.94 (1.43) 5.14 (1.23)
Happiness (1–7) 4.53a (1.67) 4.54a (1.65) 5.56b (1.20)
Frustration (1–7) 3.84 (1.94) 3.58 (1.77) 3.52 (1.76)
Anger (1–7) 2.92 (1.79) 3.14 (1.65) 2.98 (1.72)
Anxiety (1–7) 3.36 (1.78) 3.63 (1.74) 3.55 (1.99)
Cognitive dissonance (1–7) 3.40 (1.62) 3.41 (1.28) 3.21 (1.52)
Performance self-esteem (1–5) 3.39a (.85) 3.32a (.83) 3.92b (.87)
Social self-esteem (1–5) 4.01 (.84) 3.94 (.96) 4.14 (.70)
Note. Variables in which group means differed statistically according to Tukey post hoc
tests of multiple comparison (p  .001) are indicated in italics, F(2, 172)  7, p  .001.
Unshared superscripts (within rows) indicate significant mean differences. There were no
differences among groups for any of the other variables. For a full description of study details,
see Rankin, Jost, and Wakslak (2009).
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were not more likely to endorse the legitimacy
of the American social system (as measured on
the basis of Kay and Jost’s [2003] general sys-
tem justification scale), nor did they identify
themselves as any more conservative or more
supportive of the Republican Party, in compar-
ison with those respondents who doubted that
they would become rich. Financial optimism
about one’s own personal situation was unre-
lated to religiosity, a sense of security, purpose
in life, and self-reported emotion. We observed
only a few statistically significant differences.
Individuals who believed that they would be-
come rich one day reported being happier, hav-
ing a greater sense of mastery, and having
higher performance self-esteem than those who
did not believe that they would become rich
(Rankin et al., 2009).
We are by no means suggesting that individ-
ual and group self-interest are unrelated to po-
litical attitudes. On the contrary, we agree that
there is typically a significant, albeit fairly mod-
est, effect of self-interest on ideological prefer-
ences (Weeden & Kurzban, 2017; see also
Bawn, 1999). At the same time, there are many
situations in which political ideology seems to
be underdetermined by considerations of self-
interest (e.g., Hoffarth & Jost, in press), and in
these situations a social psychological account
may be useful (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009,
2013). As Railton (2000/2003) pointed out,
“Ideological analysis is not to be confused with
the sort of cynicism that attributes everything to
self-interest” (p. 359).
In this article, we focus on the role of psy-
chological needs pertaining to system justifica-
tion motivation—which we define as the (often
nonconscious) tendency to defend, bolster, and
justify aspects of the societal status quo (Jost,
Banaji, & Nosek, 2004)—and its implications
for political ideology.
Political Conservatism and
System Justification
There is by now a great deal of evidence
indicating that people who support politically
conservative leaders, parties, policies, and opin-
ions are more likely than others to believe that
the “free market” system is not only efficient
but just—and that the economic outcomes of the
rich and poor are fair and deserved, having
emanated from practices that are justified in
purely meritocratic terms (Bartels, 2008; Bé-
nabou & Tirole, 2006; Day & Fiske, 2017;
Goode, Keefer, & Molina, 2014; Jost, Blount,
Pfeffer, & Hunyady, 2003; McCoy & Major,
2007; Monteith, Burns, Rupp, & Mihalec-
Adkins, 2016). Conservatives, in other words,
exhibit stronger tendencies to engage in eco-
nomic system justification, in comparison with
liberals and moderates. Conservatives are more
likely to believe, for instance, that “Economic
positions are legitimate reflections of people’s
achievements,” “Social class differences reflect
differences in the natural order of things,” and
“Most people who don’t get ahead in our soci-
ety should not blame the system; they have only
themselves to blame” (Hennes, Nam, Stern, &
Jost, 2012; Jost & Thompson, 2000). Political
conservatism is also correlated with general
system justification, including convictions that:
“In general, the American system operates as it
should,” and “Most policies serve the greater
good” (Everett, 2013; Jost, Nosek, & Gosling,
2008; Kay & Jost, 2003).
To illustrate the empirical consistency and
robustness of the connection between political
conservatism and system justification, we pro-
vide data obtained from 26 samples of introduc-
tory psychology students at New York Univer-
sity between the years of 2004 and 2016 (see
also Hennes, 2015). Over 10,000 students from
these years reported their political orientation
on a scale ranging from 5 (Extremely Liberal)
to 5 (Extremely Conservative); their demo-
graphic characteristics are summarized in Table
2. In 24 of the 26 samples, participants also
completed Jost and Thompson’s (2000) 17-item
economic system justification scale (N 
9,761), and in 23 samples, they completed Kay
and Jost’s (2003) 8-item general system justifi-
cation scale (N  9,487). Correlational results,
which are summarized in Table 3, supported the
hypothesis that political conservatism would be
positively and significantly associated with sys-
tem justification. With respect to economic sys-
tem justification, correlations ranged from .322
to .529 (weighted average r  .429), and with
respect to general system justification, correla-
tions ranged from .174 to .461 (weighted aver-
age r  .335).
Shortly before the 2016 U.S. Presidential
election, we administered measures of ideology
and system justification to a nationally repre-
sentative sample of 1,500 Americans (see
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Azevedo, Jost, & Rothmund, in press). In ac-
cordance with past findings (Cichocka & Jost,
2014; Everett, 2013; Hennes et al., 2012; Jost,
Ledgerwood, & Hardin, 2008; Jost et al., 2014),
including results summarized in Table 3, we
observed that respondents who identified them-
selves as right-wing (vs. left-wing), more so-
cially and economically conservative (vs. lib-
eral), more aligned with the Republican (vs.
Democratic) Party, and more (vs. less) religious
scored higher on general and economic system
justification (see Table 4). Both forms of system
justification were associated with retrospective
reports of having voted for Republican presi-
dential candidates in 2008 and 2012 and with a
preference for Donald Trump over Hillary Clin-
ton in 2016, and economic system justification
was strongly associated with these political out-
comes. Consistent with a self-interest perspec-
tive, income and education were positively, al-
beit modestly, correlated with general and
economic system justification. Importantly,
economic system justification was strongly as-
sociated with intentions to vote for Trump over
Clinton at all levels of income and education.
The connection between political conserva-
tism and system justification may be especially
pronounced in the United States, where faith in
the American Dream leads people to believe
that the economic system is a truly meritocratic
one and that hard work and ingenuity will be
rewarded with success (e.g., Bénabou & Tirole,
2006; Bloom & Hobby, 2009; Hochschild,
1995; McCoy & Major, 2007). At the same
time, these general patterns do not seem to be
unique to the United States. Studies conducted
in such varied contexts as Sweden, Italy, Po-
land, and Turkey find that general and economic
system justification are associated with right-
wing (vs. left-wing) political orientation
(Cichocka & Jost, 2014; Dirilen-Gumus, 2011;
Nilsson & Jost, 2017; Pacilli, Taurino, Jost, &
van der Toorn, 2011).
In April of 2016, we surveyed a nationally
representative sample of 500 adults living in
Lebanon—an Arab country with rampant social
and economic inequality and a deeply en-
trenched hierarchical political system based on
religious sects (Badaan & Jost, 2017). We ob-
served that, as in the United States and other
Table 2
Demographic Characteristics of University Students Completing Measures of
Ideological Self-Placement and System Justification (2004–2016)
Demographic characteristics Number Percentage
Sex
Male 3,358 32.5%
Female 6,971 67.5%
No response/missing 381
Race/Ethnicity
American Indian/Alaskan Native 35 .3%
Asian 2,967 29.6%
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 61 .6%
Black/African American 499 5.0%
White/Caucasian 5,410 54.0%
More than one race 1,044 10.4%
No response/missing 694
Hispanic/Latino
Hispanic/Latino 1,240 12.4%
Not Hispanic/Latino 8,773 87.6%
No response/missing 697
Born
Born in the United States 8,087 78.5%
Born outside of the United States 2,219 21.5%
No response/missing 404
Total N  10,710
Note. Because of an administrative error, no demographic data are available for the fall 2004
semester; this omission accounts for 338 of the missing values.
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contexts, rightists and “free market” conserva-
tives scored higher than leftists and liberals on
both general and economic forms of system
justification (see Table 5). People who scored
higher on general and economic system justifi-
cation defended the legitimacy of the sectarian
political system more than those who did not,
and those who scored higher on economic sys-
tem justification tended to be more religious. In
terms of partisan alignment, economic (but not
general) system justification was significantly
associated with a preference for the neoliberal,
procapitalist “March 14” alliance over the eco-
nomically leftist, socialist-leaning “March 8”
alliance. Interestingly, the effects of income
were opposite for general and economic forms
of system justification. Poorer respondents
tended to score lower on general system justi-
fication, but they scored higher on economic
system justification; this last finding is hard to
square with a self-interest perspective (see also
Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003; Sen-
gupta, Osborne, & Sibley, 2015). Less educated
respondents scored higher on general system
Table 3
Correlations (and Sample Sizes) Between Ideological Self-Placement (Political
Conservatism) and System Justification (2004–2016)
Semester and year
Economic system
justification
General system
justification
Spring 2004 .414 (338) N/A
Fall 2004 .413 (502) N/A
Spring 2005 .322 (382) N/A
Fall 2005 .422 (419) .461 (419)
Spring 2006 .472 (407) .429 (407)
Fall 2006 .360 (490) .419 (490)
Spring 2007 .426 (376) .393 (376)
Fall 2007 .399 (513) .455 (513)
Spring 2008 .431 (435) .413 (435)
Fall 2008 .427 (489) .334 (489)
Spring 2009 .385 (204) .379 (204)
Fall 2009 N/A .232 (501)
Spring 2010 N/A .317 (446)
Fall 2010 .449 (470) .377 (470)
Spring 2011 .408 (443) .216 (443)
Fall 2011 .486 (478) .334 (478)
Spring 2012 .456 (405) .295 (406)
Fall 2012 .495 (482) .288 (482)
Spring 2013 .398 (376) .174 (376)
Fall 2013 .416 (395) .258 (395)
Spring 2014 .447 (401) .248 (401)
Fall 2014 .438 (297) .366 (297)
Spring 2015 .424 (362) .281 (361)
Fall 2015 .465 (431) .313 (432)
Spring 2016 .401 (369) .356 (369)
Fall 2016 .529 (297) .380 (297)
Range .322–.529 .174–.461
Unweighted average .426 .338
Weighted average .429 .335
Total N 9,761 9,487
Note. There were 10,710 participants who completed the ideological self-placement item;
their demographic characteristics are summarized in Table 2. Of these participants, 9,761 also
completed the economic system justification scale, and 9,487 also completed the general
system justification scale. Economic and general system justification are scored so that higher
numbers indicate greater system justification. Ideological self-placement is scored so that
higher numbers indicate greater conservatism (in general). Numerical entries are zero-order,
bivariate correlation coefficients (with sample sizes in parentheses). N/A  Not Adminis-
tered. All correlations are statistically significant, p  .001 (two-tailed).
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justification, but there was no correlation be-
tween education and economic system justifica-
tion. Overall, these results indicate that system
justification—especially economic system jus-
tification, which was found to be stronger
among poor respondents in this study—plays a
significant role in conservative, right-wing pol-
itics as well as support for the current sectarian
political system in Lebanon (Badaan & Jost,
2017).
Thus far, we have reviewed evidence demon-
strating that system justification is associated
Table 4
Correlations Between System Justification and Political Preferences in a
Nationally Representative Sample of Americans (August–September 2016)
Ideological and
demographic variables
Economic system
justification
General system
justification
General conservatism .528 .148
Social conservatism .475 .102
Economic conservatism .570 .167
Political partisanship .511 .109
Religiosity .195 .114
Income .195 .208
Education .099 .124
Retrospective vote 2008 .498 .121
Retrospective vote 2012 .524 .133
Liking for Trump .408 .095
Liking for Clinton .395 .068
Voting intention 2016 .487 .014
Note. Entries are zero-order, bivariate correlation coefficients (N  1,500). Ideological
variables scored so that higher numbers indicate greater conservatism. Economic and general
system justification are scored so that higher numbers indicate greater system justification.
Retrospective voting variables (for 2008 and 2012) are scored so that higher numbers indicate
preference for the Republican candidate (McCain and Romney, respectively) over the Dem-
ocratic candidate (Obama in both cases). Likewise, voting intention 2016 is scored so that
higher numbers indicate a preference for Trump over Clinton.
 p  .01.  p  .001 (two-tailed).
Table 5
Correlations Between System Justification and Political Preferences in a
Nationally Representative Sample in Lebanon (April 1–18, 2016)
Ideological and demographic
variables
Economic system
justification
General system
justification
Left/right ideological self-placement .297 .231
Social/cultural conservatism .034 .305
Economic conservatism .143 .417
Sectarian system justification .222 .525
Religiosity .116 .013
Income .145 .137
Education .016 .121
Partisan alignment .176 .077
Note. Entries are zero-order, bivariate correlation coefficients (N  500). Economic and
general system justification are scored so that higher numbers indicate greater system
justification. Ideological variables are scored so that higher numbers indicate more conser-
vative, right-wing orientations. Partisan alignment was defined in terms of preferences for one
of the two major political alliances in Lebanon since 2005; it was measured using a
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strong support for the “March 8” alliance, which is
predominantly economically leftist/socialist) to 5 (supporter of the “March 14” alliance,
which is predominantly economically conservative/capitalist).
 p  .01.  p  .001 (two-tailed).
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with ideological preferences that are conserva-
tive or right-wing (as opposed to liberal or left-
wing) in such varied contexts as the United
States, Lebanon, Argentina, Sweden, Italy, Po-
land, and Turkey. Consistent with the observa-
tion that there are important left–right ideolog-
ical differences in system justification
motivation, we wish to emphasize that in no
way are we implying that everyone engages in
system justification all the time, although this is
a caricature of system justification theory that
sometimes crops up. As with all other human
motives, the strength of system justification var-
ies according to situational as well as disposi-
tional factors (Jost, Gaucher, & Stern, 2015;
Jost & van der Toorn, 2012; Kay & Friesen,
2011).
Our collaborators and investigators from
other laboratories around the world have iden-
tified a number of situational factors that trigger
increased system justification motivation, in-
cluding: (a) feelings of powerlessness or depen-
dence on the system and its authorities (e.g.,
Shepherd & Kay, 2012; van der Toorn, Tyler, &
Jost, 2011; van der Toorn et al., 2015); (b)
perceptions of the status quo as inevitable or
inescapable (Kay et al., 2009; Laurin, Shepherd,
& Kay, 2010); (c) exposure to system criticism
or threat (Jost, Kivetz, Rubini, Guermandi, &
Mosso, 2005; Kay, Jost, & Young, 2005; Kay et
al., 2009); and (d) perceptions of the system as
traditional or longstanding (Blanchar & Eidel-
man, 2013; Shockley, Rosen, & Rios, 2016). In
all of these cases, the activation of system jus-
tification motivation through experimental
means has been shown to produce significant
ideological consequences, such as increased le-
gitimation of economic, racial, and gender dis-
parities in society.
Epistemic, Existential, and Relational
Motives Underlying System Justification
Phenomena such as working-class conserva-
tism have long bedeviled social and behavioral
scientists, at least in part because they appear to
violate assumptions of self-interest so strenu-
ously (Hochschild, 1981; Kelly & Enns, 2010;
Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Lane, 1962; Lukes,
2011; Luttig, 2013; Runciman, 1969; Wisman
& Smith, 2011). System justification theory was
developed to explain false consciousness and
related phenomena in social psychological
terms, that is, to analyze the cognitive and mo-
tivational processes associated with ideological
activity—and not just its sociological or politi-
cal outcomes or manifestations (Jost & Banaji,
1994; Jost & van der Toorn, 2012). It helps to
explain why—at least in some contexts—even
relatively poor people find it difficult to reject
the notion that the system on which they depend
is a truly just and meritocratic one (DiMaggio,
2015; Douglas, 2016; Godfrey & Wolf, 2016;
Im, 2014; Kraus & Tan, 2015; Newman, John-
ston, & Lown, 2015; Wiederkehr, Bonnot,
Krauth-Gruber, & Darnon, 2015).
The crux of our motivational argument is that
on some level people need or want to believe
that the institutions, authorities, and arrange-
ments on which they depend are good, fair,
desirable, and legitimate. Believing that the so-
cietal status quo is legitimate and stable serves
epistemic motives to reduce uncertainty and
unpredictability, existential motives to reduce
fear and threat, and relational motives to con-
form to and share reality with most other mem-
bers of mainstream society (Jost, Ledgerwood
et al., 2008). Because conservative ideology
supports social stability and maintenance of the
status quo rather than social change, we argue
that it is better suited—subjectively, though not
necessarily objectively—to assuaging threat,
uncertainty, and social discord.
The argument may be easier to grasp in its
negative form. To truly challenge the status quo,
one must be willing to face existential threats to
one’s physical safety and security (such as be-
ing arrested or beaten by the police), epistemic
threats such as volatile uncertainty and unpre-
dictability during and after protest movements,
and relational threats that come when friends
and family members simply do not understand
what one is protesting or why. System justifi-
cation theory may help to explain not only why
most people prefer to make peace with the sta-
tus quo, if they can, but also why stress and
burnout are so high among political activists
(Klandermans, 2003; Kovan & Dirkx, 2003;
Rodgers, 2010).
It is possible to measure the strength of epis-
temic, existential, and relational needs or mo-
tives, which vary dispositionally from person to
person, as well as situationally from one time
and place to another. That is, people differ, both
chronically and temporarily, in how much they
like to ponder the uncertainties of life, how
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much cognitive effort they wish to expend, how
sensitive they are to potential dangers and
threats, including death, and how much they
value the experience of sharing a sense of real-
ity with others. In the context of an Internet
survey of 182 American-born adults ranging in
age from 18 to 68, Hennes et al. (2012) admin-
istered several items designed to gauge epis-
temic, existential, and relational motives as well
as general and economic system justification
scales, ideological self-placement items, and a
variety of questions about public policy prefer-
ences. The results, which are summarized in
Table 6, indicated that people who scored lower
on need for cognition (that is, people who re-
ported that they did not enjoy thinking very
much) and people who scored higher on death
anxiety and the need to share reality with like-
minded others: (a) were more politically con-
servative, (b) endorsed general and economic
system justification to a stronger degree, (c)
were more likely to endorse conservative posi-
tions on issues of climate change, health care
reform, immigration policy, and plans to build a
mosque near Ground Zero of the 9/11 terror
attacks on New York City, and (d) were more
supportive of the Tea Party movement and less
supportive of the Occupy Wall Street move-
ment. Furthermore, the effects of epistemic, ex-
istential, and relational motives on political
preferences and social movement support were
statistically mediated or explained, at least in
part, by economic system justification.
We conducted a parallel study involving 373
university students in Argentina (ranging in age
from 18 to 62), in which we administered items
designed to measure epistemic, existential, and
relational motives as well as economic system
justification, ideological self-placement, and
support for the current president and opposition
party. We obtained results that were similar to
those obtained in the United States by Hennes et
al. (2012). As illustrated in Figure 1, respon-
dents who scored higher on the need for cogni-
tive closure, death anxiety, and the need to share
reality also scored higher on economic system
justification and right-wing (vs. left-wing) ori-
entation. Furthermore, economic system justifi-
cation mediated the effects of epistemic, exis-
tential and relational motives on right-wing (vs.
left-wing) orientation and partially explained
support for center-right President Mauricio
Macri in the preceding presidential election
(and rejection of the center-left opposition party
FPV or “Front for Victory” party). People who
scored higher on economic system justification
also rejected initiatives designed to promote
open and respectful discussion of controversial
issues by members of both parties and felt that
it was justifiable to limit news coverage of ral-
lies by Cristina Kirchner (leader of the FPV) to
Table 6
Correlations Between Epistemic, Existential, and Relational Motives and Various Ideological Outcomes,
Including System Justification
Epistemic
motivation
Existential
motivation Relational motivation
Ideological outcomes (Need for cognition) (Death anxiety) (Need to share reality)
General system justification .12† .18 .19
Economic system justification .29 .22 .22
Ideological self-placement (political conservatism) .24 .09 .13†
Belief in global warming .21 .18 .25
Approval of the Affordable Care Act .20 .01 .18
Approval of mandatory healthcare provision .17 .05 .12†
Approval of Arizona’s stricter immigration policy .17 .18 .11
Approval of Ground Zero Mosque plans .11 .19 .14
Support for Tea Party Movement .18 .22 .09
Support for Occupy Wall Street Movement .19 .05 .24
Note. Entries are zero-order (bivariate) correlation coefficients. Ideological self-placement is scored so that higher
numbers indicate greater political conservatism. Economic and general system justification are scored so that higher
numbers indicate greater system justification. In most cases, n  182. For a full description of study details, see Hennes,
Nam, Stern, and Jost (2012).
† p  .10.  p  .05.  p  .01.  p  .001 (two-tailed).
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prevent dissemination of their “dangerous
ideas.”
Although working-class conservatism may
be puzzling from a self-interest perspective, the
fact that system-justifying belief systems serve
underlying epistemic, existential, and relational
motives may help to explain its occurrence.
The Palliative Function of
System Justification
System justification theory posits that be-
cause of underlying epistemic, existential, and
relational needs, people are motivated (often
nonconsciously, in a variety of situations) to
defend, justify, and bolster aspects of the soci-
etal status quo, including existing social, eco-
nomic, and political systems, institutions, and
arrangements (Jost et al., 2010; Kay et al., 2009;
Liviatan & Jost, 2014). Researchers have inves-
tigated the related notion, inspired in part by
Marx’s theory of religion, that system-justifying
beliefs and ideologies serve the palliative func-
tion of making people feel better about the
status quo (Jost & Hunyady, 2003; Jost et al.,
2014). A number of studies indicate that the
expression of system-justifying sentiments is
associated with increased positive affect and
decreased negative affect (Bahamondes-Correa,
2016; Harding & Sibley, 2013; Jost, Wakslak,
& Tyler, 2008; Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, & Chen,
2007). It is comforting, in other words, to be-
lieve that the way things are is the way they
ought to be, and that prevailing institutions are
legitimate, necessary, desirable, and justifiable
(Kay et al., 2009). System justification may
even provide members of some disadvantaged
groups with a sense of control and mastery over
future outcomes (Laurin, Fitzsimons, & Kay,
2011; McCoy, Wellman, Cosley, Saslow, &
Epel, 2013; Rankin et al., 2009). It is instructive
to consider how distressing the opposite set of
beliefs would be: What would it be like to live
and work in a system that one experienced as
irredeemably awful, unfair, illegitimate, ex-
ploitative, oppressive, and corrupt?
In line with the palliative function of system
justification, studies repeatedly show that con-
servatives and rightists around the world report
being happier and more satisfied than liberals
and leftists (Napier & Jost, 2008; see also Bix-
ter, 2015; Burton, Plaks, & Peterson, 2015;
Choma, Busseri, & Sadava, 2009; Cichocka &
Jost, 2014; Okulicz-Kozaryn, Holmes, & Av-
ery, 2014; Onraet, Van Assche, Roets, Haese-
voets, & Van Hiel, 2017; Schlenker, Chambers,
& Le, 2012). Furthermore, system justification
partially mediates (or explains) the association
Figure 1. Economic system justification mediates the effects of existential, relational, and
epistemic meeds on political orientation and political preferences in Argentina. Numerical
entries are standardized regression coefficients. Political orientation is scored so that higher
numbers indicate greater right-wing orientation. The two outcome variables are continuous
measures of support for center-right President Macri and the center-left opposition party FPV
(values range from 1  No support at all to 10  Full support). Nonsignificant paths (not
shown) were fixed to zero. The model provided an adequate fit to the data: AGFI  .949,
CFI  .963, IFI  .964, RMSEA  .062 (.032–.092), 2  26,721; df  11; p  .005;
2/df  2,429. We tested indirect effects (with 95% confidence intervals) using a bootstrap-
ping analysis and found that economic system justification mediated the effects of death
anxiety {.01, .19}, shared reality {.01, .22}, and for need for cognitive closure {.01, .37} on
political orientation. In addition, political orientation mediated the effect of economic system
justification on support for Macri {.01, .42} and support for FPV {.34, .01}. p  .001.
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between ideology and self-reported happiness
(Burton et al., 2015; Cichocka & Jost, 2014;
Napier & Jost, 2008; Schlenker et al., 2012).
This does not necessarily mean that conserva-
tives are genuinely happier, let alone healthier,
than others (see Wojcik, Hovasapian, Graham,
Motyl, & Ditto, 2015)—or that conservative
societies make people happier or healthier
(Okulicz-Kozaryn et al., 2014). System justifi-
cation, after all, should be thought of as akin to
denial, rationalization, and self-deception (Jost
et al., 2010; Lerner, 1980). That is, the emo-
tional benefits of engaging in system justifica-
tion may be fairly short-lived. In the long term,
the extent to which members of disadvantaged
groups buy into the legitimacy of the overarch-
ing social system predicts psychological suffer-
ing in terms of lowered self-esteem, depressed
entitlement, and an internalized sense of inferi-
ority (e.g., Jost & Hunyady, 2003; see also
Bahamondes-Correa, 2016; Harding & Sibley,
2013; Jost & Thompson, 2000; O’Brien & Ma-
jor, 2005; O’Brien, Major, & Gilbert, 2012;
Pacilli et al., 2011; Rankin et al., 2009).
Because it serves the palliative function of
increasing satisfaction with the status quo (at
least in the short term) and decreasing action-
oriented emotions such as anger, system justi-
fication dampens support for the amelioration of
inequality (Jost et al., 2012; Jost, Becker, Os-
borne, & Badaan, 2017; Wakslak et al., 2007).
For example, Becker and Wright (2011) ex-
posed young women to relatively subtle, “be-
nevolent” justifications for sexism and found
that this led them to express more positive af-
fect, state that there are more advantages to
being a woman, and score higher on gender-
specific system justification. Exposure to benev-
olent sexism also reduced women’s intention to
participate in feminist collective action, and this
effect was mediated by system justification.
Likewise, in a nationally representative study
of New Zealanders, Osborne, and Sibley (2013)
observed that the endorsement of system-
justifying beliefs was associated with decreased
psychological distress and the withholding of
support for political mobilization. In addition,
system justification was associated with an at-
tenuation of the effects of (a) individual-based
relative deprivation on distress and dissatisfac-
tion with one’s standard of living, and (b)
group-based relative deprivation on support for
protest on behalf of one’s group. These findings
are consistent with other research on collective
action, which suggests that a strong sense of
injustice is a key motivator of protest activity
(e.g., Goodwin & Jasper, 2006; Jost et al., 2012;
Kawakami & Dion, 1995; van Zomeren, Post-
mes, & Spears, 2008).
Another potential cost to society is in terms
of the motivated perception of social problems.
System justification is associated not only with
the belief that the economic system is fair and
legitimate (Jost, Blount et al., 2003), but also
with the tendency to downplay corruption in
business and politics (Tan, Liu, Huang, &
Zheng, 2017; Tan, Liu, Huang, Zheng, & Liang,
2016). There is some reason to think that it may
also be associated with retaliation against
whistleblowers (Sumanth, Mayer, & Kay,
2011). And, finally, a number of studies suggest
that system justification actively promotes mo-
tivated skepticism about global warming as well
as biased processing of scientific information
about climate change (Feygina, Jost, & Gold-
smith, 2010; Hennes, Ruisch, Feygina, Mon-
teiro, & Jost, 2016; Jost, 2015). Thus, system
justification not only undercuts the motivation
to improve upon the status quo—it hinders the
ability to perceive it accurately. Nevertheless,
the palliative function of system justification
renders conservative ideology more psycholog-
ically appealing, and this may explain why sys-
tem justification sometimes trumps self-interest
when it comes to the attitudes held by members
of disadvantaged group members.
Conflicts Among Ego, Group, and System
Justification Motives
Importantly, we do not claim that members of
disadvantaged groups are typically or ordinarily
the most enthusiastic supporters of the status
quo, although this is a view that has been at-
tributed to us (Brandt, 2013; Caricati &
Lorenzi-Cioldi, 2012; Owuamalam, Rubin, &
Spears, 2016). In each of the examples men-
tioned above, the short-term psychological
comfort facilitated by system justification
comes at the cost of endorsing a system that
legitimates one’s own subjugation. Thus, we
would not expect those who are disadvantaged
to always (or even usually) exhibit higher levels
of system justification than those who are ad-
vantaged. The point is that members of disad-
vantaged groups are sometimes reluctant to
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criticize the system in which they are disadvan-
taged (and, in some cases, surprisingly willing
to accept its legitimacy). Other theories—which
only consider self-interested and/or group-
interested forms of motivation—are ill-
equipped to explain this phenomenon (see Car-
vacho et al., 2013; Dirilen-Gumus, 2011;
Douglas, 2016; Durrheim, Jacobs, & Dixon,
2014; Godfrey, 2013; Godfrey & Wolf, 2016;
Henry & Saul, 2006; Hoffarth & Jost, in press;
Im, 2014; Jost, Blount et al., 2003; Lane, 1962;
Sengupta et al., 2015; Shockley, Wynn, & Ash-
burn-Nardo, 2016; Pacilli et al., 2011; van der
Toorn et al., 2015; Wiederkehr et al., 2015;
Zimmerman & Reyna, 2013).
From the very start, system justification the-
ory assumed the presence of at least three po-
tentially conflicting motives or tendencies,
namely ego, group, and system justification
(Jost & Banaji, 1994). For members of advan-
taged groups, there is no real conflict or com-
petition among motives to feel good about one-
self, one’s group, and the overarching social
system (Jost & Thompson, 2000). The come-
dian Maria Bamford put it this way:
So, you guys, I love my country. And maybe that’s
because I’m White and rich, but things have been
really looking out for me. I didn’t even know there was
a game on, but I am winning. I am not, technically,
rich, but I do have a lot of shit that I do not need that
I refuse to share with anyone. And that feels solid
somehow.
By contrast, members of disadvantaged
groups are frequently in the position of having
to choose between feeling good about them-
selves (and their group) and feeling good about
the system (Jost, Burgess, & Mosso, 2001), a
conundrum that W.E.B. DuBois (1903) de-
scribed as double-consciousness: “two souls,
two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two
warring ideals in one dark body” (p. 3). To the
extent, therefore, that ego and group justifica-
tion motives are in opposition to system justi-
fication, members of disadvantaged groups are
generally expected to justify the societal status
quo less than members of advantaged groups
(Jost et al., 2001; Jost & Thompson, 2000).
Nevertheless, the fact that members of disad-
vantaged groups often find it difficult to reject in
toto the legitimacy of the social system—to
simply write it off in the name of self- or group-
preservation—is a testament to the power of
system justification motivation. In any case,
system justification theory may be useful for
understanding when members of disadvantaged
groups do—and do not—develop attitudes that
are consistent with self-interest. When the dis-
advantaged feel especially powerless or depen-
dent on the social system, when they perceive
the status quo as inevitable, inescapable, tradi-
tional, or longstanding, and when they are de-
fending the system against criticism or threat,
they should be more strongly motivated by sys-
tem justification and less strongly motivated by
considerations of self-interest. In contrast, when
ego and group justification motives are high in
salience or strength, members of disadvantaged
groups should be more likely to protest against
the status quo (Jost et al., 2017).
Applications and Next Steps: The U.S.
Presidential Election of 2016 and Beyond
The election of Donald Trump as President of
the United States in 2016 has drawn a frenzied
and eclectic set of social scientific explanations
(Konnikova, 2016; Reicher & Haslam, 2016;
Resnick, 2017). Perhaps the most obvious con-
nection is to the social psychological phenom-
enon of authoritarianism (Adorno, Frenkel-
Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950): “When
they face physical threats or threats to the status
quo, authoritarians support policies that seem to
offer protection against those fears. They favor
forceful, decisive action against things they per-
ceive as threats. And they flock to political
leaders [like Trump] who they believe will
bring this action” (Taub, 2016). A similar ac-
count emphasizes the role of social dominance
orientation: Trump voters clearly possessed a
stronger desire than Clinton voters to enforce a
hierarchical system of group-based inequality
(Blair, 2016).
Authoritarianism and social dominance ori-
entation are correlated not only with political
conservatism and system justification (e.g., Jost
& Thompson, 2000; Osborne & Sibley, 2014),
but also with prejudice, discrimination, and eth-
nocentrism (Altemeyer, 1998; Carvacho et al.,
2013; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Thus, explana-
tions focusing on authoritarianism and/or social
dominance are highly compatible with observa-
tions suggesting that support for Trump was
related to hostility directed at immigrants, sex-
ism, racial resentment, and opposition to in-
creasing ethnic and cultural diversity (e.g., Don-
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ovan, Redlawsk, & Tolbert, 2016; Major,
Blodorn, & Major Blascovich, 2016; Schaffner,
MacWilliams, & Nteta, 2017; Wayne, Valen-
tino, & Oceno, 2016).
As mentioned earlier in this article, we sur-
veyed a nationally representative sample of
1,500 Americans prior to the 2016 U.S. Presi-
dential election and administered several social
psychological instruments, including three mea-
sures of system justification (Azevedo et al., in
press). The results reveal that—even after ad-
justing for authoritarianism, social dominance
orientation, and a host of demographic vari-
ables—system justification played a significant
role in support for Trump over Clinton. Specif-
ically, when we entered general, economic, and
gender-specific system justification into a logis-
tic regression model we discovered that all three
variables exerted significant (and independent)
effects on voting intentions, although the effects
were not all in the same direction (see Table 7).
Whereas economic and gender-specific system
justification were associated with an increase in
the likelihood of voting for Trump, general sys-
tem justification was associated with a decrease
in the likelihood of voting for him. Trump sup-
porters scored significantly higher than Clinton
supporters on economic and gender-specific
system justification—but the difference was
quite small with respect to general system jus-
tification.
Moreover, this overall pattern emerged at ev-
ery level of respondent income (see Figure 2)
and education (see Figure 3). Regardless of
whether they were rich or poor or highly edu-
cated or not, supporters of Trump were far more
likely to regard the capitalist economic system
and the system of gender relations between men
and women (including the division of labor
within the family) as legitimate and justified, in
comparison with supporters of Clinton. This
was true of female as well as male respondents
(see Figure 4). With respect to race and ethnic-
ity, we observed that White and non-White sup-
porters of Clinton (vs. Trump) scored signifi-
cantly lower on all three types of system
justification (see Figure 5).
For the most part, these findings are clearly at
odds with the widespread assumption that “Mr.
Trump personified the vote against the status
quo” (Kuhn, 2016), that he was an “archetypal
anti-establishment character” (Chasmar, 2017),
and that his campaign “galvanized legions of
aggrieved Americans in a loud repudiation of
the status quo” (Tumulty, Rucker, & Gearan,
2016). It is true that Trump supporters rejected
liberal governance under President Obama (and
opposed a continuation of liberal policies under
Clinton), but the results of our survey indicate
that they were far from challenging the status
quo in a more profound sense. Supporters of
Donald Trump—like political conservatives in
general—strongly defended and justified the ex-
isting degree of economic inequality as well as
gender-based disparities in American society.
The working-class Whites who voted for Trump
may well have been deeply frustrated by the
consequences of global capitalism, but there is
little or no evidence that they blamed the eco-
nomic system itself; in ideological terms, they
appeared to be unwilling or unable to criticize
Table 7
Voting Intentions (Trump vs. Clinton) Regressed Onto Economic, Gender-
Specific, and General System Justification, Adjusting for Demographic
Variables, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, and Social Dominance Orientation
Ideological and demographic
variables Estimate Std. error t value Pr ( | t | )
(Intercept) 10.425 .816 12.769 .001
Economic system justification .583 .135 4.305 .001
Gender-specific system justification .668 .103 6.481 .001
General system justification .671 .095 7.103 .001
Right-wing authoritarianism .958 .094 10.156 .001
Social dominance orientation .361 .079 4.556 .001
Income .052 .050 1.049 .294
Education .135 .094 1.434 .151
Age .255 .059 4.315 .001
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Figure 2. Economic, gender-specific, and general system justification among respondents
who intended to vote for Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump as a function of income level. At
every income level, Trump supporters were far more likely than Clinton supporters to regard
the capitalist economic system (top panel) and the system of gender relations between men
and women (middle panel) as legitimate and justified. The picture was more complicated for
general system justification (bottom panel).
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Figure 3. Economic, gender-specific, and general system justification among respondents
who intended to vote for Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump as a function of educational level.
At every educational level, Trump supporters were far more likely than Clinton supporters to
regard the capitalist economic system (top panel) and the system of gender relations between
men and women (middle panel) as legitimate and justified. The picture was more complicated
for general system justification (bottom panel).
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Figure 4. Economic, gender-specific, and general system justification among male and
female respondents who intended to vote for Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. Male and
female Trump supporters were more likely than male and female Clinton supporters to regard
the capitalist economic system (top panel) and the system of gender relations between men
and women (middle panel) as legitimate and justified. There were no differences between
Trump and Clinton supporters in terms of general system justification for either male or
female groups of respondents (bottom panel).
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Figure 5. Economic, gender-specific, and general system justification among Caucasian and
non-Caucasian respondents who intended to vote for Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump.
Caucasian and non-Caucasian supporters of Trump were more likely than Caucasian and
non-Caucasian supporters of Clinton to regard the capitalist economic system (top panel), the
system of gender relations between men and women (middle panel), and the American system
in general (bottom panel) as legitimate and justified.
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the capitalist system and the existing social or-
der (see also Hennes et al., 2012).
Future research would do well to explore the
notion that there are multiple meaningful di-
mensions (or domains) of system justification
(Liviatan & Jost, 2014; Wakslak, Jost, & Bauer,
2011). The same individual may be an enthusi-
astic proponent of the system of traditional
“family values” (or the “free market” economy)
but an opponent of the liberal tradition of dem-
ocratic governance in the United States (or vice
versa). As Kay and colleagues (2008) demon-
strated, some people seek to satisfy epistemic,
existential, and relational needs through faith in
God, while others prefer to place their trust in
“the government.” There is, then, more than one
sense in which someone may be said to accept
or reject the societal status quo. We are only
now at the precipice of understanding the myr-
iad implications of this fact for political atti-
tudes and behavior. Far from calling into ques-
tion the importance or utility of ideological
distinctions such as conservative or progressive,
these observations highlight the fact that polit-
ical actors may be motivated by a complicated
mix of system-justifying and system-challeng-
ing concerns, depending (at least in part) upon
the social system that is in question.
Concluding Remarks
In this article, we have suggested that a mo-
tivational analysis may help to explain why,
among other things, members of disadvantaged
groups sometimes hold the same system-
justifying beliefs as members of advantaged
groups. One example among many is that of
working-class conservatism (Hochschild, 1981;
Jost, Blount et al., 2003; Lane, 1962; Lipset,
1960; Runciman, 1969). If it is true that system
justification—including justification of the cap-
italist economic system—serves fundamental
epistemic, existential, and relational needs for
certainty, security, and conformity, this could
help to explain why conservative economic at-
titudes are relatively popular even among those
who do not benefit (in material terms) from
conservative economic policies (DiMaggio,
2015; Frank, 2004; Lukes, 2011; Newman et
al., 2015; Wisman & Smith, 2011). The conclu-
sion that emerges from a system justification
analysis is fairly clear: certain kinds of conser-
vative beliefs and ideologies are likely to pos-
sess an advantage for motivational reasons, in-
cluding the fact that they better satisfy—
subjectively, but not necessarily objectively—
underlying epistemic, existential, and relational
needs, which everyone possesses to at least
some degree.
In other words, system justification theory
helps to explain the psychological appeal of
conservative ideology. In this way, our analysis
is consistent with that of Gerald Cohen (2011),
who penned a well-known philosophical essay
outlining a number of ways in which a conser-
vative mindset—which he defined as a “natu-
ral” bias in favor of existing value—is intui-
tively appealing. Likewise, Samuel Scheffler
(2010) observed that: “Most human beings have
strong conservative impulses, in the sense that
they have strong desires to preserve what they
value, including what they value about past and
present practices, forms of social organization,
and ways of life” (p. 268). At the same time,
both philosophers warn that a purely conserva-
tive attitude of this kind is problematic when it
comes to questions of hierarchy and social in-
justice. This is “because what conservatives . . .
want to conserve is that which has intrinsic
value, and injustice lacks intrinsic value (and
has, indeed, intrinsic disvalue)” (Cohen, 2011,
p. 144, emphasis added).
One of the defining ethical challenges of our
time, it would seem, is to distinguish clearly and
forcefully between those elements of the soci-
etal status quo that possess intrinsic value—
such as democratic norms, traditions, and insti-
tutions—and those that do not, such as popular
forms of chauvinism, parochialism, and social
exclusion. In some cases, “conservative impuls-
es”—which are motivated by system justifica-
tion concerns and a constellation of underlying
epistemic, existential, and relational needs—
may indeed lead us to defend and maintain
forms of social organization that are truly valu-
able; in other cases, however, such impulses
may lead us very badly astray.
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